Investment subsidies and redistributive capital income taxation in a neoclassical growth model

Günther Rehme

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2023, vol. 75, issue 4, 988-1012

Abstract: How do investment subsidies bear on pure redistribution when coupled with capital income taxes? In a heterogeneous agent, neoclassical growth framework it is found that on impact, with no optimizing behavior, investment subsidies are good for growth but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. But when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis‐à‐vis the private sector (the follower), the optimal feedback policy is by construction time‐consistent and implies that in a long‐run optimum the tax scheme does not distort accumulation. This holds regardless of social preferences. For the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium I find that (pure) redistribution can go either way and capital income taxes are nonzero in the long‐run, time‐consistent optimum, depending on the social weight of those who receive redistributive transfers, the distribution of pretax factor incomes, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is argued that investment subsidies may be an important indirect tool for redistribution, and may allow for the separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns.

Date: 2023
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