REGULATORY STRUCTURE, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND THE S& L DEBACLE

W. Nelson Richard

Contemporary Economic Policy, 1993, vol. 11, issue 1, 108-115

Abstract: Widespread S & L failures during the 1980s required the federal government to spend over 100 billion dollars bailing out the deposit insurance fund. This paper interprets the S & L debacle as a regulatory failure. Review of the S & L debacle suggests that regulators failed to manage the deposit insurance system efficiently. But the regulatory agencies' structure appears to have played a secondary role in contributing to regulatory failure. Faced with the same incentives, objectives, and resources, regulators probably would have behaved similarly regardless of the regulatory structure.

Date: 1993
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1993.tb00375.x

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