CANADIAN FARM INCOME SAFETY NETS AND U.S. COUNTERVAIL LAW

Darren Eurich, John Spriggs and Julia Taylor

Contemporary Economic Policy, 1998, vol. 16, issue 1, 47-57

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical analysis of the factors explaining U.S. countervail action. Factors that indicate changes in the political economic environment are incorporated into a logit model to explain the propensity to initiate a countervail suit. These factors, augmented by variables representing foreign subsidy specificity, are used in a logit model to explain the propensity to levy a countervail duty, once a suit is initiated. Evidence indicates that factors that would lead to political lobbying are significant in the initiation of a countervail suit. However, these variables are not significant in explaining the propensity to actually levy a duty; rather, the analysis finds that subsidy specificity criteria are the significant variables.

Date: 1998
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1998.tb00499.x

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