HOW DELEGATING AUTHORITY BIASES SOCIAL CHOICES

Michael M. Tansey

Contemporary Economic Policy, 1998, vol. 16, issue 4, 511-518

Abstract: Delegating authority can bias social choices. The bias derives from the persuasion process that accompanies social decision making. When decision makers can decide to delegate their authority, asymmetries in decision makers' persuasiveness and openness to persuasion can play an important role in distorting the outcomes of social choices. When permitted in social decision making, such ad hoc delegating may favor extreme points of view and may force more group decisions to formal, social‐choice mechanisms such as voting.

Date: 1998
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