 A COST‐BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENLARGING THE JAPANESE JUDICIAL SYSTEMTomio Kinoshita Contemporary Economic Policy, 2002, vol. 20, issue 2, 179-192 Abstract: This article presents a cost‐benefit analysis of enlarging the Japanese judicial system, especially the civil section of District Courts (CSDC). Constructing a simple econometric model of CSDC, the effects of increase of judges on the supply of judicial services and the trial time are analyzed. Then a cost and benefit calculation is done. The basic assumption is that the total benefit of the judicial system is the aggregate of monetary value of a suit (MVS). The main conclusions are: (1) The demand elasticity for a civil trial with respect to trial time is –1.3 to about –1.4, and its income elasticity is 0.95. (2) The supply of civil trials is proportional to the number of judges. (3) Ten‐percent increase of judges will shorten the average trial time by 5.2%. (4) The net benefit of CSDC is estimated to be ¥466 billion per year if the annual discount rate is 10%. (5) Judging from the demand and supply relation, if CSDC is doubled, the net increase of total benefit per year will be ¥543 billion. (6) If the benefit of the external effect on lawyers' market is added, the total net benefit will reach almost ¥1 trillion, which is 0.22% of gross domestic product. Date: 2002 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:20:y:2002:i:2:p:179-192 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Contemporary Economic Policy is currently edited by Brad R. Humphreys More articles in Contemporary Economic Policy from Western Economic Association International Contact information at EDIRC. |
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