THE ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL FUNDS TO PROMOTE BUREAUCRATIC OBJECTIVES: AN EMPIRICAL TEST
Shirley Svorny () and
Contemporary Economic Policy, 2002, vol. 20, issue 3, 209-220
This article tests whether Job Training Partnership Act Title III discretionary funds are allocated to meet bureaucratic objectives. These funds are targeted to provide a rapid response to mass layoffs or natural disasters and are therefore well suited for detecting political influence because program distributions are awarded contemporaneously and eligibility is difficult to anticipate. After controlling for worker displacements and disaster declarations, discretionary outlays are higher in states with close congressional races, politically active constituents, and powerful congressional representatives. There is additional evidence of politics in the reduction of aggregate outlays during presidential election years.
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