CRIMINAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Thomas Miceli

Contemporary Economic Policy, 2008, vol. 26, issue 2, 207-215

Abstract: This article studies the institutional structure of criminal sentencing, focusing on the interaction between legislatures, which set sentencing ranges ex ante, and judges, who choose actual sentences from within those ranges ex post. The key question concerns the extent to which judges are afforded discretion in sentencing, given the possibly divergent interests of legislatures and judges regarding the social function of criminal punishment. The ongoing debate over federal sentencing guidelines provides a context for discussing the policy implications of the model. (JEL K14, K42)

Date: 2008
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2007.00065.x

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