INTEREST GROUPS, DEMOCRACY, AND POLICY VOLATILITY

Jac Heckelman and Bonnie Wilson

Contemporary Economic Policy, 2016, vol. 34, issue 2, 223-233

Abstract: type="main" xml:id="coep12118-abs-0001"> Democratic polities appear to produce more stable policy than do autocracies. In this paper, we explore a potential source of the policy stability observed in democracies: special-interest groups. We find that interest groups are associated with greater stability in some measures of policy and that groups mediate the stabilizing impact of democracy on policy. We also find that the impact of interest groups on policy volatility depends on the degree of polarization in a society. (JEL P16, O43, D7)

Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Interest Groups, Democracy, and Policy Volatility (2015)
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