Tournament incentives and performance: Evidence from the WNBA

Brian Hill

Contemporary Economic Policy, 2021, vol. 39, issue 4, 882-900

Abstract: Players entering the Women's National Basketball Association (WNBA) are allocated to teams based on a draft where lower performing teams in the regular season earn the highest odds of selecting the best players, creating an incentive for teams to lose games. Using data from the 2000–2019 seasons, results indicate that WNBA teams are more likely to lose after they have been eliminated from postseason playoffs regardless of the gender of the coach or general manager. Evidence of tanking is concentrated in seasons after the WNBA made a draft lottery change in 2015, which was intended to reduce tanking.

Date: 2021
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