ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET ECONOMY, AND DEMOCRATICALLY INDUCED DELUSIONS

Dwight R. Lee

Contemporary Economic Policy, 1986, vol. 4, issue 4, 22-37

Abstract: It is widely assumed that weak economic performance in the Soviet Union provides motivation for Soviet leaders to pursue arms negotiations in good faith. This paper argues that the reality is quite the opposite. For both political and economic considerations, the weak economy of the Soviet Union generates incentives for the Soviets to use arms control negotiations to achieve military advantages rather than to limit arms.

Date: 1986
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