INSIDER TRADING: THE LAW, THE THEORY, THE EVIDENCE

Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen and Philip L. Hersch

Contemporary Economic Policy, 1988, vol. 6, issue 3, 1-13

Abstract: This paper reviews the arguments concerning the role and effects of insider trading. In reviewing the law of insider trading, we concentrate on the main elements of the regulatory framework and court interpretations. We discuss economic issues involved in the debate over the benefits and costs of insider trading. Finally, we discuss evidence illustrating that legal market research can explain much of the runup in a target firm's stock price before a tender offer is formally announced.

Date: 1988
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