DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICT AND MONETARY POLICY

Thomas Havrilesky

Contemporary Economic Policy, 1990, vol. 8, issue 2, 50-61

Abstract: This paper develops a public choice theory of monetary policy and compares it with political‐macroeconomic outcomes theory. The paper develops support for the public choice theory from recent historical evidence. It then employs this theory to explain the difficulty of effecting monetary reform and, in the absence of reform, the difficulty of implementing sustained periods of monetary restraint.

Date: 1990
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