Interlocking Ownership in the Korean Chaebol

Dong‐Woon Kim

Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2003, vol. 11, issue 2, 132-142

Abstract: This paper analyses how a dominant entrepreneur of the Korean chaebol is able to exercise control, despite having a tiny shareholding, through strategic interlocking ownership. The entrepreneur organises his intimate group, consisting of three clusters of in‐house shareholders, and they together have controlling interests in only a few subsidiaries, mainly public companies. These central subsidiaries, as quasi‐holding companies, control most other member companies. The resultant ownership structure resembles a grid, in which individual subsidiaries’ ownership structures are intermingled.

Date: 2003
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00014

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:corgov:v:11:y:2003:i:2:p:132-142

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... ref=0964-8410&site=1

Access Statistics for this article

Corporate Governance: An International Review is currently edited by William Judge

More articles in Corporate Governance: An International Review from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().