Executive Compensation Policy and Company Performance in Japan

Katsuyuki Kubo

Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2005, vol. 13, issue 3, 429-436

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies’“way to pay their director” matters or not. Firstly, we fail to find a positive relationship between the performance–pay sensitivity and company performance. Thus, these results do not support our hypothesis that those companies that intensify the performance–pay sensitivity are more likely to improve their performance. In addition, this research fails to find a positive relationship between the change of pay policy and performance. These results are consistent with previous studies that directors’ pay is not designed to motivate directors to work toward shareholders’ value.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:corgov:v:13:y:2005:i:3:p:429-436

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