The Monitoring Role of the Board: one approach does not fit all

Lutgart van Den Berghe and Tom Baelden

Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2005, vol. 13, issue 5, 680-690

Abstract: Among the many roles boards of directors perform, the monitoring role of the board has received the most attention recently, resulting in higher demands on boards and directors to be vigilant monitors. By presenting a framework to tailor the monitoring role of the board to the specific situation and needs of the company, this paper tries to overcome the negative effects of an excessive focus on control. In so far as boards are, to a certain extent, free to define their own delegation policy, this framework highlights two essential decisions of the board, namely the decision which responsibilities and authorities are delegated to management and the decision whether to delegate them to a single‐headed or joint management. Some preliminary empirical findings supporting the central argument are presented, together with some suggestions for further research.

Date: 2005
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