Relationship Investing

Robert A. G. Monks

Corporate Governance: An International Review, 1994, vol. 2, issue 2, 58-76

Abstract: “As the number of institutional investors increased, some prophets said that these investors, moved by their stakes and informed by their expertise, would begin to play in earnest the supervisory roles of the legendary stockholder. But through the 1960's [equally true through the 1990's] the record showed little to bear out the prophecies. The size of their assets commanded respect when institutional investors sought information; by their probing they introduced some fresh surveillance into corporate affairs. Nonetheless, the institutional investors generally behaved as individuals did; like individuals, they expressed dissatisfaction with the government of a corporation by selling out rather than by voting their shares for new men or different decisions. On rare occasions institutional investors cast their weight for a change in top management; rarer was evidence of their influence brought to bear on particular issues of corporation policy.”

Date: 1994
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