The Control of CEO Compensation by Institutional Investors: An Empirical Study of Agency Theory in Large U.S. Industrial Corporations

Frank L. Winfrey

Corporate Governance: An International Review, 1994, vol. 2, issue 4, 211-224

Abstract: This paper reviews the organizational control process, its role, and outlines the role of ownership control as applied to executive compensation. The findings from the study suggest that institutional ownership is an important factor in the compensation of CEOs of large U.S. industrial firms. Other factors found to be of consistent influence are firm size and firm profitability.

Date: 1994
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.1994.tb00080.x

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