The Corporate Monitoring Firm

Mark Latham

Corporate Governance: An International Review, 1999, vol. 7, issue 1, 12-20

Abstract: Shareholders can gain effective control over their firm’s management by voting to choose an outside agency to nominate director candidates. This would give the board and management a greater incentive to serve the owners’ interests, resulting in higher productivity of capital, more realistic levels of executive pay, less short‐termism, and a moderation of the corporate bloat that tends to necessitate drastic cuts. Such a system would further improve corporate governance in western countries, and provide a much needed “quick fix” for governance problems in Asia.

Date: 1999
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