CABINET DETERMINANTS OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1985–2000

David Altman and Rossana Castiglioni

The Developing Economies, 2008, vol. 46, issue 1, 1-25

Abstract: Little research has been devoted to the analysis of how different characteristics of the executives affect structural reforms. This article analyzes the impact of cabinet fragmentation and the presidential ideological position on the scope of structural reforms in nine Latin American presidential democracies of the postauthoritarian period. In so doing, it treats cabinets as conglomerates of actors that are accountable both to the president and to their parties, with nonpartisan ministers being only accountable to the president. It shows that the higher the percentage of nonpartisan ministers, the lesser the costs associated with bargaining a reform within the executive. When presidents build governing coalitions, they limit their capacity of acting unilaterally. However, they are better able to advance their structural reform proposals than single‐party governments are. Data on cabinet composition were collected by the authors and data on the dependent variable structural reform comes from Lora (2001).

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-1049.2007.00053.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:deveco:v:46:y:2008:i:1:p:1-25

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0012-1533

Access Statistics for this article

The Developing Economies is currently edited by Katsuji Nakagane

More articles in The Developing Economies from Institute of Developing Economies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().