SGACA: The Rise and Paradoxical Demise of a Political-Economy Instrument

Wil Hout and Lydeke Schakel

Development Policy Review, 2014, vol. 32, issue 5, 611-630

Abstract: type="main">

This article discusses the Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA) introduced in 2007 by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a tool for political-economy analysis of governance structures in aid-receiving countries. It suggests an explanation of the paradox that SGACA was generally seen as a strong analytical instrument, yet was discarded within one 4-year policy cycle. Drawing on the literature on policy innovations, it argues that there are three main causes of this demise: first, the collective-action problems involved in getting innovations implemented in the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; second, the fact that the policy window opened for SGACA by the mid-2000s did not stay open throughout the implementation process; and third, the bureaucratic politics played out in the environment in which SGACA had been developed.

Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/dpr.12075 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:devpol:v:32:y:2014:i:5:p:611-630

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0950-6764

Access Statistics for this article

Development Policy Review is currently edited by David Booth

More articles in Development Policy Review from Overseas Development Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().