Politicisation of Conditional Cash Transfers: The Case of Guatemala

Johan Sandberg and Engel Tally

Development Policy Review, 2015, vol. 33, issue 4, 503-522

Abstract: type="main" xml:id="dpr12122-abs-0001">

This article complements existing studies on the incumbency effects of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) by analysing the principal mechanisms by which Mi Familia Progresa (MIFAPRO) in Guatemala became increasingly politicised through clientelistic vote buying and threats of programme expulsion in case of non-electoral support. It finds that MIFAPRO constitutes an emblematic case with mixed effects that are particularly relevant in the diffusion of CCTs to other developing countries.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/dpr.2015.33.issue-4 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:devpol:v:33:y:2015:i:4:p:503-522

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0950-6764

Access Statistics for this article

Development Policy Review is currently edited by David Booth

More articles in Development Policy Review from Overseas Development Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().