Donor Requirements and Pockets of Effectiveness in Senegal's Bureaucracy

Martha C. Johnson

Development Policy Review, 2015, vol. 33, issue 6, 783-804

Abstract: type="main" xml:id="dpr12134-abs-0001">

Donors increasingly value the work of statistics, project assessment and related offices in developing countries, but can they ensure these offices are able to do their work? This article assesses donors’ efforts to do so in Senegal's ministries of finance, health and agriculture in the mid-2000s. It contends that donors' impact is greatest if they generate political incentives for governments to create ‘pockets of effectiveness’ in these areas. The health and agriculture case studies indicate that direct donor involvement, particularly if incompatible with domestic political forces, produces disappointing results, while the finance case studies suggest donors can induce political support for the work of specific offices if donor incentives coincide with domestic political imperatives.

Date: 2015
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