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The structural design of conditional cash transfers: Colombia, India, and the USA compared

Augusto De Venanzi

Development Policy Review, 2022, vol. 40, issue 4

Abstract: Motivation In recent years, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have become progressively popular in low‐, lower‐middle, and upper‐middle income countries, although a recent attempt has been made to replicate this type of programme in the United States. Yet, the potential of CCTs to perform well under different settings and to address a broader range of challenges is not clear. Purpose The article aims is to identify the major differences in the structural design and outcomes of CCTs in three areas of the world. Methods and approach The article looks at differences in the objectives, targeting mechanisms, incentives, conditionalities, cash transfer systems, and outcomes of Colombia's Más Familias en Acción, India's Janani Suraksha Yojana—although reference is made to other Indian CCTs—and the US's Family Rewards. Findings The study found differences among the selected CCTs not only in terms of their objectives and cultural underpinnings, but also in their targeting effectiveness and ability to monitor compliance. These limitations were markedly present in the case of the implementation of CCTs in India where undue political interference also represents an issue of concern for the proper operation and evaluation of these programmes. Yet, despite their differences in structural design, the observed CCTs were able to provide several benefits to targeted populations. Policy implications The need for strong programme governance emerges as the main policy implication of this study.

Date: 2022
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