Can ODA enable autocratic entrenchment? Investigating donor‐driven cash transfer programmes in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Egypt

Guido Maschhaupt, Ahmed El Assal and Petronilla Wandeto

Development Policy Review, 2025, vol. 43, issue 4

Abstract: Motivation An increasing share of ODA goes to electoral autocratic states. This is concerning because aid carries the risk of entrenching existing power inequalities in recipient states, especially more autocratic ones. Western donors may not be well equipped to navigate these risks, given their own incentive structures to focus on concrete, technical, and short‐term results, as opposed to broader political concerns. One area of particular concern is cash transfers, which are both a major policy priority for Western donors and a policy area with well‐documented political benefits for the regimes that implement them. Purpose This article examines the potentially negative and long‐term political consequences that donor support for cash transfers in electoral autocratic states can have on autocratic entrenchment. It focuses on three case studies of cash transfer programmes in electoral autocratic states: the Senior Citizens’ Grant in Uganda, the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia, and the Takaful and Karama programme in Egypt. Approach and methods This article applies comparative political economy analysis to three case studies, drawing on existing political analyses in journals, reports, and other secondary data and grey literature. Findings Cash transfer programmes can be used by ruling regimes to legitimize themselves, to co‐opt opposition groups, or to compensate for other unpopular reforms. As such, their long‐term developmental impact can be jeopardized. Specific donor‐influencing strategies can have the unintended effect of reinforcing regime entrenchment when they participate in clientelist logic, use financial leverage, and exclude civil society from the policy process. Policy implications Donors and policy‐makers have a duty of care to think more critically about the appropriateness of development interventions in autocratic states. The negative long‐term political consequences of cash transfer programmes may be less tangible than the short‐term benefits to recipients, but they could outweigh them in the long run.

Date: 2025
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