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CONSTITUTIONALISM, FEDERALISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Norman Barry

Economic Affairs, 2004, vol. 24, issue 1, 11-16

Abstract: The purpose of a constitution should be to restrain governments. The proposed EU constitution does not do that ‐ it provides agendas for government action. There is also no mechanism to facilitate jurisdictional competition. As such, if adopted, it will lead to further centralisation and abuse of statutory powers.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2004.t01-1-00451.x

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