ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INTER‐JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION

Martin Ricketts

Economic Affairs, 2004, vol. 24, issue 1, 28-33

Abstract: The European Union does not set its regulatory principles in line with those that the theory of public goods suggests. The Union does not have full competence in areas such as defence that might involve public goods over a Europe‐wide area. Yet it does have competence over many areas that should be left to member states or local government. However, if competition between jurisdictions is prevented, there will be a drift towards centralisation of economic decision‐making. This paper analyses this trend from the point of view of the theory of clubs and theories of market failure.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2004.t01-1-00454.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:24:y:2004:i:1:p:28-33

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0265-0665

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Affairs is currently edited by Philip Booth

More articles in Economic Affairs from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().