FEDERATION WITH MAJORITY DECISIONS: ECONOMIC LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF THE UNITE D STATES, GERMANY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Roland Vaubel

Economic Affairs, 2004, vol. 24, issue 4, 53-59

Abstract: This article examines the potential impact of qualified majority voting on decision‐making within the EU. It draws on the experience of US federalism, Germany under Bismarck and the UK in the European Union. In each case, it is shown that geographical majorities (nations, states or regions) have used majority decision‐making as a means of increasing their rivals’ costs. It is argued that to prevent such behaviour in the future in the EU, the proposed Constitutional Treaty should raise, not lower, the decision‐making quorum.

Date: 2004
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