SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT ORGANISATION AND PUBLIC DEBT CRISES

Charles Blankart and Achim Klaiber

Economic Affairs, 2006, vol. 26, issue 3, 48-54

Abstract: Multilevel governments can be organised according to two basic principles: the principle of autonomy and the principle of vertical public administration. In between, there are a number of mixed systems which are questionable from the point of view of distribution of responsibilities. Subnational public debt crises typically occur in mixed federal systems. Preferable to such systems are pure systems with clear responsibilities. Nevertheless, courts can establish clear liability rules and hence contribute to a stabilisation of federal systems. However, court decisions do not supersede a political choice between either of the two pure systems. Two case studies on local governments illustrate under what circumstances a system of autonomy is preferable and how this result can be applied to the European Union.

Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2006.00649.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:26:y:2006:i:3:p:48-54

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0265-0665

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Affairs is currently edited by Philip Booth

More articles in Economic Affairs from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().