The political economy of ‘ordered competition’ in European telecoms
Dmitrii Trubnikov and
Economic Affairs, 2019, vol. 39, issue 2, 184-196
This article discusses the current efforts of policymakers to spur development of telecommunications infrastructure. It argues that the policy of ‘ordered competition’, widely implemented in this sector, has formed a highly beneficial environment for major players, who have the ability to influence the regulatory machine. The system protects the status quo, impedes the efficiency of the market process and allows unnecessary public subsidy of the industry's development. The main alternative to this regulatory regime is structural reform of the industry and the formation of a genuinely competitive marketplace which could function without ex ante regulation.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:39:y:2019:i:2:p:184-196
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