IMPOSED HEALTH INSURANCE IN MONOPOLISTIC MARKETS: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

Harry Frech and Paul B. Ginsburg

Economic Inquiry, 1975, vol. 13, issue 1, 55-70

Abstract: The impact of public health insurance on price and output of medical care is analyzed within the context of monopolistic markets for health services. An important result, which is not obtained in competitive markets, is that indemnity benefits cause smaller price increases than service benefits, both directly and indirectly through the effect of benefit structure on the production of information. Various types of price regulation are considered, including limitation to “usual, customary, and prevailing” levels, a frequently used technique. With a simple dynamic model this type of regulation is shown to cause chronic price inflation.

Date: 1975
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1975.tb01103.x

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Journal Article: Imposed Health Insurance in Monopolistic Markets: A Theoretical Analysis (1975)
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