STRATEGIC DECISIONS ON LAWYERS’ COMPENSATION IN CIVIL DISPUTES

Kyung Baik and In‐gyu Kim

Economic Inquiry, 2007, vol. 45, issue 4, 854-863

Abstract: We study a model of civil dispute with delegation in which a plaintiff’s lawyer works on a contingent‐fee basis but a defendant’s lawyer on an hourly fee basis. We first derive the condition under which delegation to the lawyers brings both litigants more payoffs compared with the case of no delegation. We then show that under this profitable delegation condition, the contingent‐fee fraction for the plaintiff’s lawyer is about one‐third. Next, allowing the plaintiff to choose between the two fees, we show that under the profitable delegation condition, the plaintiff chooses the contingent fee, given that the defendant adopts the hourly fee. (JEL K41, K13, D74, D72)

Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00054.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Decisions on Lawyers' Compensations in Civil Disputes (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:45:y:2007:i:4:p:854-863

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://ordering.onl ... s.aspx?ref=1465-7295

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Tim Salmon

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().