DO CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS MATTER FOR MONETARY POLICY?

Stephen Cecchetti and Lianfa Li

Economic Inquiry, 2008, vol. 46, issue 4, 643-659

Abstract: Central bankers and financial supervisors can have conflicting goals. While monetary policymakers work to ensure sufficient lending activities as a foundation for high and stable economic growth, supervisors may limit banks’ lending capacities in order to prevent excessive risk taking. We show that, in theory, central bankers can avoid this potential conflict by adopting an interest rate strategy that takes accounts of capital adequacy requirements. Empirical evidence suggests that while policymakers at the Federal Reserve have adjusted their interest rate to neutralizing the procyclical impact of bank capital requirements, those in Germany and Japan have not. (JEL E52, E58, G21)

Date: 2008
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00085.x

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Working Paper: Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Matter for Monetary Policy? (2005)
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