CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION: A NOTE

Charles Carlstrom and Timothy Fuerst

Economic Inquiry, 2009, vol. 47, issue 1, 182-186

Abstract: We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two‐thirds of the improved inflation performance of these nations over the past two decades. (JEL E42, E58)

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00148.x

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Working Paper: Central bank independence and inflation: a note (2006)
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