INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES IN A STRATEGIC SETTING: THE 3‐POINTS‐FOR‐A‐WIN SYSTEM IN SOCCER

GianCarlo Moschini

Economic Inquiry, 2010, vol. 48, issue 1, 65-79

Abstract: I exploit a major structural change that has occurred in world soccer to study the impact of incentives on outcomes in a strategic setting. A game‐theoretic model is developed that captures some essential strategic elements of soccer vis‐à‐vis the number of points awarded to a win. The observable implications of the model are tested using a large data set that spans 30 years and 35 countries. The empirical results support the theoretical model and show that the 3‐point system has led to a statistically significant increase in the expected number of goals and a decrease in the fractions of drawn matches. (JEL C72, L83, C23)

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00177.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives and Outcomes in a Strategic Setting: The 3-Points-for-a-Win System in Soccer (2010)
Working Paper: Incentives and Outcomes in a Strategic Setting: The 3-Points-For-A-Win System in Soccer (2008)
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