ON THE PREFERENCES OF PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS
Marco Castillo (marco.castillo@tamu.edu),
Ragan Petrie and
Maximo Torero
Economic Inquiry, 2010, vol. 48, issue 2, 266-273
Abstract:
One of the reasons why market economies are able to thrive is that they exploit the willingness of entrepreneurs to take risks that laborers might prefer to avoid. Markets work because they remunerate good judgment and punish mistakes. Indeed, modern contract theory is based on the assumption that principals are less risk averse than agents. We investigate if the risk preferences of entrepreneurs are different from those of laborers by implementing experiments with a random sample of the population in a fast‐growing, small‐manufacturing, economic cluster. As assumed by theory, we find that entrepreneurs are more likely to take risks than hired managers. These results are robust to the inclusion of a series of controls. This lends support to the idea that risk preferences is an important determinant of selection into occupations. Finally, our lotteries are good predictors of financial decisions, thus giving support to the external validity of our risk measures and experimental methods (JEL C93, D81, D86).
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00189.x
Related works:
Working Paper: On The Preferences of Principals and Agents (2007) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:48:y:2010:i:2:p:266-273
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://ordering.onl ... s.aspx?ref=1465-7295
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Tim Salmon
More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery (contentdelivery@wiley.com).