FLIP‐FLOPPING: IDEOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE
Jason DeBacker ()
Economic Inquiry, 2015, vol. 53, issue 1, 108-128
Using a long panel of roll call voting data, I find that “flip‐flopping” senators face significant electoral costs when changing positions. In models of electoral competition, as the costs to candidates changing position approach zero, the equilibrium prediction is the convergence of platforms. Such convergence is at odds with empirical observation. Using a dynamic, structural model of candidate positioning, I identify the nature of the costs associated with changing position that may result in such non‐convergence. (JEL D72, C61, H11)
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Working Paper: Flip-Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs in the United States Senate (2014)
Working Paper: Flip-Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs in the United States Senate (2008)
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