QUOTA‐HOPPING IN‐BOND DIVERSION

Lorenzo Rotunno and Pierre-Louis Vézina

Economic Inquiry, 2015, vol. 53, issue 1, 34-48

Abstract: We show that the U.S. in‐bond system of imports may be used by firms to illegally avoid trade barriers, a practice known as in‐bond diversion. The illicit scheme involves declaring Chinese exports bound for Mexico but diverting them to the U.S. market while in transit, thus creating a gap between Chinese and Mexican reports. Using the phaseout and removal of U.S. quotas at the end of the Multifiber Agreement as a policy experiment, as well as variation in quota bindingness across products, we show that quota‐bound products were associated with larger trade gaps which shrunk following the quota removals. (JEL F13, O17, O19)

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12128

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:53:y:2015:i:1:p:34-48

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://ordering.onl ... s.aspx?ref=1465-7295

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Tim Salmon

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().