THE EFFECTS OF ASSET FORFEITURE ON POLICING: A PANEL APPROACH

Brian D. Kelly and Maureen Kole

Economic Inquiry, 2016, vol. 54, issue 1, 558-575

Abstract: type="main" xml:id="ecin12232-abs-0001"> Asset forfeiture has proven highly controversial in the United States since its expansion in 1984. Most contentious is the widespread policy that allows police agencies to keep the assets seized, which both proponents and critics assert changes police behavior. From newly developed panel data sets, we find some statistical support for the proposition that police agencies change the intensity and pattern of policing in response to forfeiture. However, in economic terms these effects are very weak and do not support the proposition that forfeiture provides vital funds and incentives for crime policing. (JEL H39, H71, K42)

Date: 2016
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