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QUANTIFYING THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF ANTICARTEL ENFORCEMENT

Stephen Davies, Franco Mariuzzo and Peter L. Ormosi

Economic Inquiry, 2018, vol. 56, issue 4, 1933-1949

Abstract: This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anticartel policy. It develops a conceptual framework, which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification. This is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy. Measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred, our best estimate is two‐thirds and, even on conservative assumptions, at least half of all harms (or seven times the detected harm) is deterred. (JEL H11, K21, L44)

Date: 2018
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