FOSTERING THE BEST EXECUTION REGIME: AN EXPERIMENT ABOUT PECUNIARY SANCTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN FIDUCIARY MONEY MANAGEMENT
Matteo Ploner and
Alec N. Sproten
Economic Inquiry, 2019, vol. 57, issue 1, 600-616
Asset management often involves a conflict of interests between investors and fund managers. A main goal of financial regulators is to identify and mitigate this conflict. This article focuses on measures that may foster protection of investors' interests. In an experiment capturing the essential elements of asset management, we find that managers' accountability does not prevent their opportunistic behavior if not backed by a threat of punishment. Further, investors inefficiently sanction managers if not completely aware of managers' choices. To effectively protect investors in financial intermediations, financial regulators should ensure both managers' accountability and a credible sanctioning system.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Fostering the Best Execution Regime An Experiment about Pecuniary Sanctions and Accountability in Fiduciary Money Management (2016)
Working Paper: Fostering the best execution regime: An experiment about pecuniary sanctions and accountability in fiduciary money management (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:57:y:2019:i:1:p:600-616
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0095-2583
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Preston McAfee
More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().