CYCLICAL TAX ENFORCEMENT

José M Durán‐Cabré, Alejandro Esteller‐Moré and Luca Salvadori
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jose M. Duran-Cabre

Economic Inquiry, 2020, vol. 58, issue 4, 1874-1893

Abstract: We wonder whether tax enforcement varies along the economic cycle and aim at answering that question from a positive perspective by means of survey data for the Spanish case (1994–2015). According to a fiscal capacity argument, tax enforcement might be stronger in times of crisis (counter‐cyclical), but if the tax administration prioritizes taxpayers' welfare over public revenue, enforcement might be slacker (procyclical). We find tax enforcement is not immune to the state of the economy. In particular, it presents a prevailing counter‐cyclical trend, but in presence of a severe economic crisis it turns out to be procyclical. (JEL D78, H12, H26, H83)

Date: 2020
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