BUDGET COMMITTEE AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER: EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH KOREA
Hyun‐A Kim,
Dongwon Lee and
Sangwon Park
Economic Inquiry, 2020, vol. 58, issue 4, 1894-1906
Abstract:
This paper revisits the claim that members of legislative committees direct more earmark spending to their constituents. In South Korea's legislature, a national law regulating the budget committee provides an unusual source of exogenous variation in membership: members of the committee are rotated each year owing to 1‐year term limits. Using data from 226 local governments, and both within‐district and within‐member variations in membership, we find that districts represented by a budget committee member secure roughly 3% more subsidies than those represented by a nonmember. (JEL D72, D78, H70)
Date: 2020
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