SOCIALLY OPTIMAL PLEA BARGAINING WITH COSTLY TRIALS AND BAYESIAN JURIES

David Bjerk

Economic Inquiry, 2021, vol. 59, issue 1, 263-279

Abstract: This paper investigates optimal plea bargaining when trials are costly, defendant guilt is uncertain, and juries rationally respond to the plea bargaining policy employed. The model shows that when innocence rates among the arrested are low, it is optimal to offer all defendants pleas that are acceptable to guilty and innocent defendants. However, as the innocence rate becomes more significant, optimal plea policy switches to one in which plea offers are only acceptable to guilty defendants. However, even when optimal, the societal benefits to such separating policies are limited due to constraints on the frequency such offers can be made. (JEL D6, D8, K4)

Date: 2021
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