Tullock contest with reference‐dependent preferences

Francesco Fallucchi and Francesco Trevisan

Economic Inquiry, 2024, vol. 62, issue 4, 1618-1628

Abstract: We study the Tullock contest model with loss aversion and endogenously formed reference points. In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players and convex effort costs, we establish sufficient conditions for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of loss aversion on players' spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.

Date: 2024
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