Leadership in a social dilemma: Does it matter if the leader is pro‐social or just says they are pro‐social?

Edward Cartwright, Yidan Chai and Lian Xue

Economic Inquiry, 2025, vol. 63, issue 1, 160-180

Abstract: Previous studies have shown that pro‐social leaders cooperate, on average, more than pro‐self leaders in social dilemmas. It can, thus, be beneficial for the group to have a pro‐social leader. In this paper we analyze the consequences of a leader informing followers that they are pro‐social (or pro‐self). In doing so, we compare a setting in which the leader's type is truthfully revealed to settings where the leader can ‘hide’ or ‘lie’ about their pro‐sociality. We find that a leader saying they are pro‐social boosts efficiency, even if the signal is not fully credible. Cooperation is highest in a truth setting with a pro‐social leader. We demonstrate that these results are consistent with a belief‐based model of social preference in which the stated type of the leader changes the frame of reference for followers.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13256

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:63:y:2025:i:1:p:160-180

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