Does giving tax debtors a break improve compliance and income? Evidence from quasi‐random assignment of IRS Revenue Officers

William C. Boning, Joel Slemrod, Ellen Stuart and Alex Turk

Economic Inquiry, 2025, vol. 63, issue 2, 486-503

Abstract: This paper uses the quasi‐random assignment of IRS Revenue Officers to tax debtors' cases as an instrumental variable to identify the causal effects of suspending debt collection on tax compliance and future income. In contrast to uninstrumented estimates, we find no statistically significant evidence that putting off attempts to collect debt reduces compliance with future tax obligations or future reported income. Among marginal hardship cases, pausing collection instead increases future income, specifically wage earnings by the taxpayer's spouse. In addition, we address concerns about potential non‐random assignment of Revenue Officers.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13268

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