Stable Multilateral Trade Agreements

Inés Macho‐Stadler, David Pérez‐Castrillo and Clara Ponsati

Economica, 1998, vol. 65, issue 258, 161-177

Abstract: We analyse multilateral tariff negotiations as a game in coalition form. In a model with three identical countries that produce and trade an homogeneous commodity, and where countries’ aggregated welfare can weight differently their different components, we analyse how changes in the countries’ objective affects the stability of coalitions. In other words, we characterize what tariff‐agreements, if any, are stable (i.e. lie in the core).

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00121

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:65:y:1998:i:258:p:161-177

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Access Statistics for this article

Economica is currently edited by Frank Cowell, Tore Ellingsen and Alan Manning

More articles in Economica from London School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().