Amnesties, Settlements and Optimal Tax Enforcement

Luigi Alberto Franzoni

Economica, 2000, vol. 67, issue 266, 153-176

Abstract: This paper develops a model of tax enforcement in which the tax agency has discretionary power to make pre‐audit settlement offers. Settlements can take the form of either general amnesties or individual deals. It is shown that pre‐audit settlements allow the agency to overcome its limited control over the enforcement parameters (the agency takes the tax and penalty levels as given) and to increase net revenue. Amnesties prove to be superior to individual deals since they allow the agency not only to extract from taxpayers their defence costs, but also to reduce an excessive tax differential.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00202

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:67:y:2000:i:266:p:153-176

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Access Statistics for this article

Economica is currently edited by Frank Cowell, Tore Ellingsen and Alan Manning

More articles in Economica from London School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().