Optimal At‐will Labour Contracts

Ed Nosal

Economica, 2001, vol. 68, issue 270, 187-201

Abstract: An at‐will employment rule allows parties to sever their employment relationship for ‘a good reason, a bad reason or no reason at all’[Schawb, S. (1993) Life‐cycle justice: accommodating just cause and employment at will. Michigan Law Review, 92, 8‐‐62]. A specific performance employment rule allows any party to force the other party to perform as specified in the contract. Although the theory of labour contracting generally assumes enforcement by specific performance, in practice, the vast majority of non‐union employment relationships are mediated by an at‐will rule. When employment contracts are enforced by an at‐will rule, I show that the ‘standard’ counter‐intuitive predictions generated by standard labour contracting models disappear.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00241

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:68:y:2001:i:270:p:187-201

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Access Statistics for this article

Economica is currently edited by Frank Cowell, Tore Ellingsen and Alan Manning

More articles in Economica from London School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().