Child Labour and Resistance to Change

Giorgio Bellettini, Carlotta Berti Ceroni and Gianmarco Ottaviano

Economica, 2005, vol. 72, issue 287, 397-411

Abstract: We study the interaction between technological innovation, investment in human capital and child labour. In a two‐stage game, first firms decide on innovation, then households decide on education. In equilibrium the presence of inefficient child labour depends on parameters related to technology, parents' altruism and the diffusion of firms' property. Child labour is due either to firms' reluctance to innovate or to households' unwillingness to educate, or both. In some cases, compulsory schooling laws or a ban on child labour are welfare‐reducing, whereas a subsidy for innovation is the right tool to eliminate child labour and increase welfare.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-0427.2005.00422.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Child Labor and Resistance to Change (2003)
Working Paper: Child Labor and Resistance to Change (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:72:y:2005:i:287:p:397-411

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Access Statistics for this article

Economica is currently edited by Frank Cowell, Tore Ellingsen and Alan Manning

More articles in Economica from London School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().